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The recent German discussion has witnessed increasing interest in the Dual In-
come Tax. The analysis of its merits, as opposed to those of a comprehensive
income tax, is usually conducted with the main argument of the increasing mo-
bility of ﬁnancial capital in mind. This article pursues an alternative route of
reasoning, arguing that the composition of the tax base of labor income entails a
differentiation of the tax rates on capital and labor income. The time effect inher-
ent in this dualism causes allocational distortions of unknown magnitude. It is
modeled employing effective tax rates. The extent of the divergence is determined
empirically, using German cross-sectional data from the 2004 wave of the Socio-
Economic Panel‡. The uneven distribution of this advantage across differently
educated brackets of society is uncovered. The paper concludes with proposals
to remedy the situation and a tentative endorsement of the Dual Income Tax.
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II1 Introduction
1 Introduction
The recent German discussion has revitalized the interest in the Dual Income Tax ﬁrst
aroused by the introduction of such a tax in the Nordic countries during the 1990s. Wis-
senschaftlicher Beirat beim BmF (2004) and Sachverst¨ andigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2006) constitute major contributions to the domes-
tic political discussion. From an academic point of view, Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007)
build an elaborate model to assess the likely impact of the Dual Income Tax on Swiss
and German macroeconomic performance. Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2005) conduct
experiments concerning the likely welfare effects of a German switch to the Dual Income
Tax: They ﬁnd a positive effect on capital accumulation, GDP and household consump-
tion. Their experiment leads to a welfare gain of 0.8% in the long run.
The case for a possible switch to a Dual Income Tax is conventionally buttressed by a
line of argumentation that runs as follows (Sørensen, 1994): the continuing integration
of international capital markets has rendered high taxes on capital income untenable.
The introduction of a Dual Income Tax is seen as a reaction to these exogenous forces.
Its primary goal is to maintain or improve the competitive position of a country and keep
as much capital as possible within its borders1. These arguments are also pursued by
Cnossen (1999, p. 24), Eggert and Genser (2005, p. 42) and Schratzenstaller (2004, p.
28).
Only very few articles advance different arguments. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997, p.
312) argue that the tax base of labor income is essentially made up of cash-ﬂows so
that the rate of return on investments in human capital is not reduced by taxation and
the investment is consequently extended too far in comparison with other sources of
income. Similarly, Kaplow (1994, 1996) and Wagner (2000) cite the differences in the
determination of the tax bases of labor and capital income as a major reason to apply
different tax rates to them. Recent contributions to the subject at the very least do not
overemphasize this point. Sørensen (2005, p. 563) mentions it brieﬂy.
Yet the consequences of the fact that the tax base of labor income is mostly made up of
cash-ﬂows should not remain uninvestigated. A comprehensive income tax lumps these
cash-ﬂows together with accounting proﬁts derived from physical capital and returns
from ﬁnancial capital and applies a common tax schedule to the sum. Under the Dual
Income Tax, these streams are separated along the lines of labor income on the one hand
and capital or residual income on the other hand2.
Still, the mere insight into the necessity of a discrimination between labor and capital
income taxation naturally prompts one to investigate the optimal difference between the
relevant tax rates. This process should logically proceed in three distinct steps:
1 This argumentation rests on the Public Finance insight that the factor that is supplied more
inelastically should be taxed more heavily (Salani´ e, 2003, p. 20). Trostel (1993) conducts a
policy experiment where he exposes an economy to an unexpected permanent increase in the
income tax rate. He ﬁnds (Trostel, 1993, p. 337) that a 1 percent increase in the tax rate
translates into a long-run decline in the human capital stock by 0.39 percent whereas physical
capital shrinks by 1.37 percent. Physical capital is thus deemed to be over three times more
sensitive to changes in taxes and should therefore be treated more leniently for tax purposes.
2 The recent German discussion has been marred by a wrongheaded attempt to shift the de-
marcation line to the question of income generation within and outside of enterprises (Stiftung
Marktwirtschaft, 2006). For this distinction, there is no theoretical basis. It merely derives
its popularity from a deep-rooted popular uneasiness with the idea of a reduction in the tax
burden for entrepreneurs.
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• First of all, optimality can only be determined with regard to a “yardstick”, thus
when there is clarity as to the tax system that is ultimately desired. Here, the old
dogﬁght between income and consumption taxation comes into play again.
• Then, one needs some measure of the different tax burdens currently weighing on
labor and capital under the prevailing comprehensive income tax. To this end,
the present paper lays out a strategy to assess the extent of the disparity of tax
burdens on capital and labor income in Germany on the basis of effective tax rates
(ETRs). To derive empirical results, the latest wave of the Socio-Economic Panel is
employed.
• In conclusion, a technique is required to align the tax burden on capital and labor.
Empirically, the revenue derived from the German tax system is heavily tilted towards
labor income taxation. M¨ uller (2004, p. 77) reports statistics for Germany that show the
overwhelming contribution of taxes on labor income to the German tax base: 79.9% of
the aggregate tax base is made up of taxes on labor. On page 80, M¨ uller reinforces this
importance, reporting that 91.0% of taxpayers actually pay income tax on labor income
as opposed to only 14.2% paying any taxes on capital income3.
Human capital is one of the major research topics in economics. At the same time,
there is a fair degree of uncertainty about the very nature of human capital. While it
is clear that it is not tangible like physical capital, it is also more elusive than ﬁnancial
capital in that its size is not immediately ascertainable. The struggle to deﬁne human
capital can be observed in Rimmler (2005). While Rimmler deﬁnes it as “the stock of
knowledge and abilities of individuals...” (p. 6), he later arrives at a more hands-on
deﬁnition (p. 8): The “value of an individual human capital stock can at any point in
time be determined as the present value of future returns from human capital”.
In the case of human capital, investments are often called “education”. Yet funda-
mentally, education exhibits all the properties of an investment: someone engaging in
education deprives himself of consumption opportunities today in order to get back at
least the same consumption possibilities tomorrow, adjusted for the passage of time by
some rate of time preference. The only obvious – but economically meaningless – differ-
ence is that education does not necessitate substantial cash payouts. Instead, most of
its costs to the individual4 come as opportunity costs: students forgo wage income during
their university studies. Direct cash outlays (for tuition fees, books etc.) pale in compari-
son (Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997, p. 322). Thus, there is no reason to alter substantially
the instruments used to analyze decisions on human capital investments from the ones
used for physical capital.
From these facts, it is apparent that the attention devoted by the literature to tax
effects concerning capital income is not warranted: the smaller pie has received an undue
amount of attention while the larger one has been neglected. On top of that, far too little
interest has been stirred by the interplay between the taxation of physical and ﬁnancial
capital on the one hand and human capital on the other hand. This paper sets out to
3 For the American discussion, Davies and Whalley (1989, Appendix A) compare different ap-
proaches to the correct measurement of the economy wide human capital stock (some ranging
as high as 96 % of the entire capital stock) and arrive at the conclusion that the human cap-
ital stock is at the very least “substantially larger in aggregate value than the physical capital
stock” (Davies and Whalley, 1989, p. 50).
4 Society expends signiﬁcant amounts of money on education, but this investment is not part of
the individual decision to acquire an additional unit of human capital.
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provide an approximation to a unifying treatment of human and physical capital while
maintaining the notion of a comprehensive income tax5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 seeks answers to the question
why an adjustment of taxes on human capital payoffs to the taxation of ﬁnancial capital
under the current income tax makes sense. Section 3 derives the effective tax rates
needed to tackle the problem. Section 4 assesses the quality of the approximation and
proposes several possible remedies to rectify the situation. Section 5 concludes. An
appendix provides mathematical derivations.
2 Why Approximate Income Taxes?
2.1 The Desirability of a Comprehensive Income Tax
The properties of a theoretical comprehensive income tax have been discussed more than
extensively in the last decades. Omitting the usual reference to von Schanz (1896),
Haig (1921) and Simons (1938), the recent literature deﬁnes its tax base as one “that
includes the market value of consumption plus changes in net wealth on an accrual
basis” (Owens, 2006). The practical implementation of this seemingly simple concept
usually takes the following form:
• For ﬁnancial capital, at least for a standard investment6, the economic proﬁt is
taxed.
• For physical capital, accrual taxation at least aims in the direction of the economic
proﬁt, without any a priori assurance of hitting it.
• For human capital, tax law does not even bother to ask for economic proﬁts, but
takes cash-ﬂows as its tax base.
Even if tax law calls the resulting sum “income”, this term is deprived of its meaning
by the odd mixture of different elements just enumerated.
On top of these practical problems, academic research provides ample analyses of the
deﬁciencies of income taxation with regard to notions of neutrality. Two infringements of
neutrality stick out in particular:
• Neutrality with regard to consumption choices: an income tax levies a tax burden
on interest and thus distorts agents’ distributions of consumption over time.
• Neutrality with regard to investment choices: an income tax distorts the pre-tax
ranking between investment projects.
Under a comprehensive income tax, only the latter demand can be met, by the tax-
ation of economic proﬁts Ept as ﬁrst described by Johannson (1969) and Samuelson
(1964), where the tax base TB
Ep
t is made up of the economic value of future cash-ﬂows




t = iEVt−1 = Ept = CFt − Edpt (1)
5 A more comprehensive treatment of the subject matter can be found in Weiss (2007).
6 As represented by a coupon bond.
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where the depreciation charges are deﬁned as
Edpt = EVt−1 − EVt (2)




CFk (1 + i)
−k+t (3)
The uncertainty regarding future cash-ﬂows needed to derive EVt renders the appli-
cation of an actual income tax on economic proﬁts impossible. Yet as a theoretical con-
struct, the taxation of economic proﬁts has served as a “yardstick” of “optimal” income
taxation for over three decades.
The distortions in the intertemporal distribution of consumption introduced by an
income tax have led to calls for the introduction of consumption taxes, namely cash-ﬂow
taxes as described by Brown (1948) and the allowance for corporate equity (Boadway
and Bruce, 1982, 1984; Wenger, 1983).
2.2 Consistency of an Economic Income Tax
Wenger (1999) argues that the whole notion of an economic income tax collapses once
economic rents are taxed. When looking at a project that just about earns its capital
costs, i.e. whose net present value equals zero, the economic value EVt equals zero for
all periods t ∈ [−∞;−1] so taxation can set in at point in time t = 0 since there is no
tax base prior to this point, as is apparent from equation (1). Once the project becomes
proﬁtable, this cozy arrangement is destroyed as the economic value can now be traced
back into the inﬁnite past: the formation of a positive economic value no longer coincides
with the ﬁrst cash-ﬂow. As another year goes by, the cash-ﬂows draw a little nearer and
thus generate economic income. Under a comprehensive income tax, this income is
taxable. A proﬁtable project thus has to carry a tax burden in the inﬁnite past.
While the very idea of going back into inﬁnity for tax purposes may seem far-fetched,
a consistent comprehensive income tax must see to it that it imposes the same present
value of taxes on projects with the same net present value before taxes, no matter when
the ﬁrst cash-ﬂow occurs. Wenger (1999, p. 53) shows that this attempt can go either
way:
1. If tax law does not make up for its failure to tax past income, the whole setup turns
out to be a cash-ﬂow tax as mentioned in subsection 2.1.
2. If tax law does aim to make up for the failure, it must apply a conﬁscatory tax rate
of 100 percent to the economic rent.
This inconsistency should not pose too big a problem in the case of physical capital
where competitive pressure holds economic rents close to zero on average. Yet for the
case of human capital, this assumption cannot be justiﬁed. Net present values of labor
earnings are generally large, and the criticism uttered by Wenger (1999) is consequently
highly relevant for the discussion.
The whole notion of income taxation thus lacks a proper theoretical foundation. The
implications of this sentence are staggering: the literature has been using the taxation
of the economic concept of proﬁt as a calibration mark7 to assess the quality of different
7 Schreiber (2005, p. 549) uses the “neutral income tax” as a gauge of tax effects.
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regimes of income taxation (Niemann et al., 2003; Treisch, 2000). The papers by Kaplow
(1994, 1996) and Wagner (2000) take the “ideal income taxation” as their point of ref-
erence. Kaplow (1994, p. 1479) states that “...the present analysis asks how an ideal
income tax would treat human capital”.
This paper does not attempt to incorporate this criticism into its derivation of the op-
timal difference between the labor and capital income tax rate: the public discussion
of tax reforms is focused almost entirely on income taxation and is thus unlikely to be
swayed by arguments favoring the abolition of income taxation on account of its theo-
retical inconsistency. Yet it should be born in mind as a caveat that all results derived
henceforth are rendered shaky – to say the least – by the contribution of Wenger (1999).
3 Effective Tax Rates on Human Capital in Germany
3.1 Estimation of the Wage Equation
3.1.1 The Wage Equation
To measure effective tax rates, one needs to investigate the empirical distribution of hu-
man capital payoffs over time. To this end, a conventional Mincer-type earnings function






= β0 + β1Gj + β2sj + β3EXt,j + β4EX2
t,j + εt,j (4)
where the logarithmic (monthly) income Y m
t,j of the jth individual at point in time t is
explained by Gj, a gender dummy8, sj, the years of schooling enjoyed by individual
j, and EXt,j, the experience in the labor market gained by individual j up to point in
time t9.
Equation (4) is by some measures the most frequently estimated equation in econo-
metrics. Yet, one should not pretend that it is a ﬂawless measure of earnings power:
From an econometric point of view, the regressors in an ordinary-least-squares (OLS)
regression must be exogenous, that is uncorrelated with the error term. In equation (4),
this cannot be guaranteed:
• The “ability” of an individual is not a regressor in equation (4), but an omitted
variable. Abilities impact both income and decisions to engage in education. Thus,
schooling and the error term are likely to be positively correlated.
• Misreported data can induce a further bias as individuals are known to underesti-
mate their schooling regularly.
This problem leads to a bias in the estimation output from an OLS regression. A part of
the income increases is wrongly attributed to schooling, while in reality it is due to innate
abilities. All else equal, the coefﬁcient of the schooling variable is thus overestimated.
Consequently, the results emanating from equation (4) must be viewed with a grain of
salt. The problems10 mentioned above can be remedied by using instrumental variable
8 Set equal to 1 for men.
9 Cf. Franz (2003, p. 91) for the derivation.
10 On top of these problems, the regressand “income” represents a hash of different economic
decisions. Y m
t,j can be calculated as hours worked times the prevailing wage rate. While the
former is a labor supply decision, the latter describes, in most cases, a labor demand outcome,
since most jobs are offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it”-basis (Greene, 2003, p. 52).
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techniques (Greene, 2003, p. 74). The dataset, as described in subsection 3.1, does not
contain such variables so that the results obtained from the regressions in table 4 on
page 8 are valid as rough approximations only.
3.1.2 The Dataset
The dataset used to estimate the wage equation is taken from one of the latest waves of
the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), conducted in 2004 by the DIW11. Information on the
SOEP12 is delivered by Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 16):
“The SOEP was started in 1984 as a longitudinal survey of private house-
holds and persons in the Federal Republic of Germany. The central aim of this
panel study is to collect representative micro-data on persons, households
and families in order to measure stability and change in living conditions by
following principally a micro-economic approach enriched with sociology and
political science variables, mainly determined by the ‘Social Indicator’ move-
ment.”
The enormous size of the original dataset can be whittled down to eight variables for
the purposes of this paper. These are enumerated in table 1.
Table 1
Original variables used in the estimation of the wage equation
Variable Name Variable Content
Personal Characteristics
up13901 Gender
up13902 Year of birth
Education
ubilzeit Duration of education, in years
upbbil01 Vocational degree received
upbbil02 Completed college education




up5901 Gross income last month
All variable names start with a “u”, indicating the 2004 wave of the SOEP.
Once the dataset has been restricted to these eight variables, additional variables are
generated. These are listed in table 2 on the next page.
After the generation of these variables, the ﬁle has to be further restricted to the
working age population13 (age 6 65) and to those in full or part-time employment at
11 Deutsches Institut f¨ ur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin.
12 Further comprehensive information on the SOEP project and de-
tailed descriptions of all the variables in the dataset can be found at
http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2003/soepinfo2003.html.
13 The youngest person in the dataset is 17 years old, so there is no need to adjust for too young
a worker.
63 Effective Tax Rates on Human Capital in Germany
Table 2
Variables generated for the estimation of the wage equation
Variable Name Variable Content Calculation
age Age 2004 minus year of birth
exp Labor Market Experience Age minus ubilzeit minus six
exp 2 Experience squared Experience taken to the square
gender Dummy for gender Set to 1 for men, 0 for women
ln income Logarithmic income Logarithm of up5901
per month
the time of the survey. Following these modiﬁcations, the sample size drops to 9,414
observations per variable.
To derive results for speciﬁc subgroups of workers, the dataset can be divided along
the lines of the highest school degrees as contained in the variables upsbil and upbbil02.
Among the possible combinations of school and vocational degrees, only prominent ones
with more than 400 observations are picked. These are enumerated in table 3.
Table 3
Combinations used in the regressions in subsection 3.2.3
Combination Description
A Overall (Whole Dataset)
B Secondary School (Hauptschule) degree holders
with subsequent apprenticeship
C Intermediate School (Realschule) degree holders
with subsequent apprenticeship
D Upper Secondary School (Abitur) degree holders
with subsequent apprenticeship
E Upper Secondary School (Abitur) degree holders
with subsequent university studies
German degree names in brackets
3.1.3 Estimation Results
The results14 of the estimation of equation (4) are displayed in table 4 on the next page.
As usual in a semilog speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient for schooling can be interpreted as
the percentage change in wages (numerator in equation (5)), given a one-unit increase in



















As schooling is measured in years, this coefﬁcient gives the return to an additional
year of schooling for the average individual. At 9.13%, this estimate ﬁnds itself right in
14 Robust standard errors are used throughout the paper.
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the middle of empirical estimates in the literature15.
The signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient estimates is high across the board, with the excep-
tion of the squared experience term. The gender dummy is signiﬁcant as well, indicating
some wage discrimination on account of gender in the dataset. The R2 measure ranges
from 20-odd percent to over 30 percent for the whole dataset (combination A), which is
quite satisfactory in a cross-sectional regression.
Table 4
Results of the earnings equation regression (equation (4))
Combination A B C D E
Schooling 0.0913∗∗ 0.0801∗∗ 0.1232∗∗ 0.1060∗∗ 0.0746∗∗
Experience 0.0361∗∗ 0.0182∗∗ 0.0124∗ 0.0349∗∗ 0.0656∗∗
Experience2 -0.0006∗∗ -0.0002† -0.0001† -0.0005† -0.0012∗∗
Gender 0.5430∗∗ 0.6898∗∗ 0.4776∗∗ 0.3185∗∗ 0.4781∗∗
Intercept 5.7631∗∗ 6.0003∗∗ 5.6951∗∗ 5.6462∗∗ 5.8328∗∗
Nobs 9,386 1,497 1,835 488 1,423
R2 32.4% 28.6% 20.7% 22.8% 21.8%
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
3.2 Derivation of Effective Tax Rates
3.2.1 Effective Tax Rates
Effects of taxation are customarily divided into three categories (Wagner, 2005, p. 454):
Time Effects Time effects are only relevant in a multiperiod context. They arise because
investment alternatives with the same undiscounted sum of tax bases feature dif-
ferent distributions of those tax bases over time, thus triggering different tax pay-
ments at different points in time. Investors care c.p. less about later tax payments
than earlier payments due to the time value of money.
Tax Base Effects Tax base effects arise because alternatives are subject to discrimina-
tory treatment under tax law. Typically, some alternatives are taxed because they
are carried out within a ﬁrm while private transactions of the same kind are not
subject to taxation16.
Tax Rate Effects Tax rates can differ across alternatives because tax law stipulates dif-
ferent tax rates for different economic activities. For example, the idea to apply ﬁnal
withholding taxes to interest income causes a tax rate effect against the backdrop
of otherwise progressive tax rates.
15 Belzil and Hansen (2002, fn.2) cite estimates around 15% as “not uncommon”. Psacharopoulos
and Layard (1979) ﬁnd a return of 9.7% for English and Welsh men in 1972. Bellmann and
Gerlach (1984) calculate a more mundane return of 7% for German men at the end of the
1970s.
16 German Income Tax Law allows private capital gains stemming from a stake below the legal
threshold of 1 % to be realized tax-free once a certain period of time has elapsed (§§17,23 EStG).
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The method employed in this paper to gauge the discrimination in tax burdens is the
concept of effective tax rates as introduced at the beginning of the 1980s by Auerbach
and Jorgenson (1980) and Bradford and Fullerton (1981), further developed by King and
Fullerton (1984) and extended from coverage of only marginal to lucrative investments
by Devereux and Grifﬁth (1999). It is meant to condense the three tax effects mentioned
above into one number. The yardstick to measure an equal tax burden across both
human and physical capital is assumed to be the taxation of ﬁnancial capital under a
comprehensive income tax, i.e. full taxation of interest.
Effective tax rates are designed to measure the tax-related reduction in the degree to
which investors reach their goals or the “share of value-added generated by an economic
decision that is taken in tax” (Heady, 2003, p. 2). Thus, the broadest expression of an
effective tax rate is given by
Economic goal before tax – economic goal after tax
Economic goal before tax
=
Tax wedge
Economic goal before tax
(6)
Equation (6) does not make reference to a speciﬁc criterion for the economic goal that
investors pursue. There is a whole array of suitable candidates (Knirsch, 2002, p. 8),
among them the net present value, NPV, and the Internal Rate of Return, IRR.
The advantages and disadvantages of the criteria have been discussed extensively in
the literature. Collins and Davies (2003) use the IRR as their criterion in their analysis
of ETRs on human capital in Canada. The main drawback here is that decisions based
on IRRs are only valid if there are no interim cash-ﬂows. Yet human capital is the main
asset of most households and is precisely meant to yield interim cash-ﬂows. The present
paper chooses the net present value of the cash-ﬂow from human capital as the relevant












where T denotes the end of the lifetime of the individual concerned. The after tax value





(1 + i(1 − τ))
t (9)
where taxation takes a bite to the tune of the constant tax rate τ out of both the cash-
ﬂow in the numerator of equation (9) and the constant interest rate i in the denominator,
representing opportunity costs.
3.2.2 Assumptions of the Calculations
To derive the actual ETRs, one needs an assumption concerning the length of the educa-
tion spells of the individuals in the dataset to measure sj in equation (4). Some standard
durations of schooling and occupational training for different groups are provided by
Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 69) and displayed in table 5 on the next page.
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Table 5
Conversion of degrees into imputed educational times
English Name German Name Imputed Duration
Imputed Schooling Times
Lower School Degree Hauptschule 9 Years
Intermediary School Degree Realschule 10 Years
High School Degree  Hochschulreife 13 Years
University Universit¨ at 5 Years
Apprenticeship Lehre 1.5 Years
Imputed Professional Experience
Apprenticeship Lehre 1.5 Years
Source: Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 69)
  Imputed duration for “High School Degree” is taken to be 13 years across the board, although some
German states are currently switching to 12 years.
Once individuals have concluded their education, their education times become a con-
stant and the only variable left in the earnings function is the labor market experience17.
The imputed times contained in table 5 are entered into equation (4) together with the
estimation results in table 4.
The actual ETRs are calculated as in equation (7) through equation (9), with T set
equal to the statistical life expectation in Germany, as reported in Statistisches Bundes-
amt (2006), where men are assumed to live for 76 years. To cover the period between
retirement and life expectancy T, a simpliﬁed pension scheme, designed to mimic the
German pay-as-you-go scheme, is introduced.
• A 10% pension contribution on the gross income of the employee is applied18. This
monthly contribution earns the employee award points (AwP) that give him a legal
claim to a pension once he hits the retirement age of 65 years.
• The award points represent the fraction of the gross earnings divided by the statu-
tory average income which is taken to be19 30,000 D.
• The contributions are capped at a contribution ceiling of 60,000 D. Therefore, the
employee can earn a maximum of two award points per year.
• As for the tax treatment of pensions, full deductibility of the contributions and
full taxability of the beneﬁts is assumed, as this is in line with the future system
currently being phased in in Germany.
• The beneﬁciary is entitled to a pension that is calculated by multiplying the award
points accumulated upon reaching the retirement age with the prevailing “pension
value” which is ﬁxed at 26 D.
17 As mentioned above, the dataset has been restricted to individuals that work either full or
part-time. The assumption is that there are no unemployment spells in the job biography so
that experience can simply be measured as “age minus age at graduation”.
18 This contribution is matched by an equally sized contribution from the employer which is
factored into the eventual pension payments.
19 Inﬂation is ignored throughout the paper.
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For a male secondary school (Hauptschule) degree holder with subsequent appren-
ticeship (Combination B in table 3), the approach is illustrated in ﬁgure 1 on the next
page.
Figure 1
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Table 6 on the following page shows the ETRs resulting from the coefﬁcients estimated
in table 4. The following derivation shows the calculation for a male upper secondary
degree holder with subsequent university studies20.
To this end, equation (4) is transformed and the results from the last column of table 4
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Compared with equation (4), the error term  t drops out of the calculation as equa-
tion (10) returns the expected monthly gross wage, conditional on the exogenous vari-
ables gender, schooling and labor market experience. The ETRs are calculated by ﬁtting
this expectation into equation (8) and equation (9). Equation (7) then yields the desired
effective tax rate.
From table 6, a tendency towards lower ETRs for the more highly educated brackets
of society is obvious. Generally, the ETRs rarely exceed the statutory tax rate and, for
increasing interest rates, heavily undercut it.
20 Combination E in table 3.
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Table 6
ETRs for male workers, for selected education brackets (combinations from table 3
in brackets), for different interest rates i and tax rates τ
Hauptschule with Realschule with
apprenticeship (B) apprenticeship (C)
i 1% 3% 5% i 1% 3% 5%
τ 10% 14.7% 8.7% 3.7% τ 10% 14.6% 8.5% 3.4%
15% 17.6% 8.5% 0.7% 15% 17.6% 8.3% 0.3%
20% 20.7% 8.7% -2.1% 20% 20.7% 8.4% -2.6%
25% 24.1% 9.1% -4.7% 25% 24.0% 8.8% -5.4%
30% 27.5% 9.9% -7.1% 30% 27.5% 9.5% -7.9%
35% 31.2% 11.1% -9.1% 35% 31.1% 10.7% -10.1%
40% 35.1% 12.7% -10.7% 40% 35.0% 12.3% -11.8%
Abitur with Abitur with
apprenticeship (D) university studies (E)
i 1% 3% 5% i 1% 3% 5%
τ 10% 14.4% 7.8% 1.9% τ 10% 14.3% 7.4% 1.1%
15% 17.3% 7.2% -2.0% 15% 17.2% 6.7% -3.1%
20% 20.4% 7.0% -5.8% 20% 20.2% 6.3% -7.3%
25% 23.6% 7.0% -9.4% 25% 23.4% 6.2% -11.4%
30% 27.0% 7.4% -12.8% 30% 26.8% 6.4% -15.3%
35% 30.6% 8.3% -15.9% 35% 30.4% 7.1% -18.8%
40% 34.4% 9.6% -18.5% 40% 34.2% 8.3% -21.8%
4 Assessment of the Approximation
4.1 Quality of the Approximation
As a yardstick to gauge discrimination or privilege of human capital under an ideal in-
come tax, the ETR on human capital should be equal to the nominal tax rate τ. To see
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t = (1 − τ)NPV
(11)
for which the proof is found in the appendix in section A. Equation (11) assumes that
the taxation of economic proﬁts includes the taxation of the initial appreciation at the
point in time t = 0 as taxable income21.
Using this result, equation (7) thus turns into
21 Here, the contribution by Wenger (1999) comes into play again, as discussed in subsection 2.2.
As mentioned there, it is simpliﬁed to the assumption of one initial appreciation at t=0. This
assumption has its detractors. Wagner (2000) does not include it in his calculations. The







NPV − (1 − τ)NPV
NPV
= τ (12)
Equation (12) shows that any ETR falling short of the nominal tax rate τ indicates
a tax privilege compared to the taxation of physical and ﬁnancial capital. Table 6 then
drives home the point that for the most realistic case of a 5% interest rate22, human
capital is substantially privileged under the current income tax system.
The results in subsection 3.2 serve to highlight the fact that the current income tax-
ation is uneven – not only between different types of capital, but also within human
capital: the big winners under the current system are the highly educated holders of a
degree of the upper secondary schools, possibly with subsequent university studies.
Following the customary division of effects of taxation into time, tax base and tax rate
effects23, it is apparent that for the upper education brackets in Germany, the tax rate
and time effects combine24 comfortably:
1. Higher average tax rates for this group take a bite out of both the numerator and
denominator of equation (9).
2. At the same time, the longer education spell for this group defers the onset of tax-
ation into the future. The increases in the economic value of future human capital
payoffs accruing during the period of education are not taxed under the current in-
come tax while they would be part of the tax base under the ideal income tax. The
current cash-ﬂow taxation thus ends up beneﬁting those that policymakers often
want to burden most. The progressivity of the income tax is turned on its head.
The last point warrants further elaboration. The time effect is due to the fact that over








where the initial appreciation takes place at t = 0 as in equation (11). Yet investors
take their decisions based on the discounted sums: under a cash-ﬂow tax, taxation is
deferred until there is a realization event whereas the ideal income tax adds accruals to
the tax base. As the cash-ﬂow tax spares the worker the taxes due on the appreciations
of his human capital, he is better off: the initial appreciations are discounted less than
consequence for equation (11) would be that the ﬁrst part of the formula would have to be
dropped. The net present value before and after taxes would coincide and equation (12) would
yield a constant value of zero. The unambiguous result of a privilege for human capital under
the current income tax would no longer hold. Instead, low tax and interest rates would then
produce a substantial disadvantage in terms of taxation for human capital.
22 When discussing interest rates in this model setup, it is worth mentioning that inﬂation is not
part of the discussion and that nominal and real interest rates consequently coincide. A value
of 5% is thus quite high. On the other hand, a constant interest rate implies a ﬂat yield curve:
with the time horizon stretching out over 75 years into the future, that is a bold assertion
that is not backed up by any real capital market experience. Thus, overall, 5% seems to be a
sensible choice to balance both factors.
23 Cf. subsection 3.2.1 on page 8.
24 The interplay between these effects and the progressivity of the income tax are discussed com-
prehensively in Weiss (2007, p.69 and ﬁg. 3.14).
25 Equation (13) is proved in the appendix in section B.
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the later depreciations. The failure to tax the former is more precious to the worker than
the denial of deductions for the latter.
This argument – and the distortions between differently educated workers caused by
it – can be made yet more transparent by highlighting the development of the economic
value of future wages implied by the results in table 4 for the combinations B and E.
Figure 2 traces the development of this value along the lines of increasing labor market
experience26.
Figure 2
Development of the economic value of future wages for combinations B and E in
table 3 on page 7, i = 7%, without pensions
It is easily inferred that the appreciations are far more pronounced in the case of the
university degree holder and that he stands to gain more from the failure of current tax
law to tax them. For the combination B type of worker, the almost complete absence of
appreciation charges implies that he cannot proﬁt from this deﬁciency.
4.2 Remedies for the Approximation
As the discussion in subsection 4.1 has shown, the taxation of physical and ﬁnancial
capital on the one hand and human capital on the other hand is far from uniform. This
fact has managed to go unnoticed in the discussion of tax reforms in Germany and
elsewhere. In those countries that did introduce a Dual Income Tax, it rarely featured
among the most salient arguments.
26 This implies that the individuals in ﬁgure 2 have different ages at any one point along the
x-axis as the labor market participation only sets in at the age of 23 for the group E students.
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The list of possible remedies includes, but is not restricted to, the Dual Income Tax.
• Among the more radical proposals, the replacement of the current income tax with
a cash-ﬂow tax would solve the problem once and for all27. Its introduction would,
at the same time, be tantamount to an acknowledgement that – as mentioned in
section 2 – the overwhelming majority of the German tax revenue derives from
wage – i.e. cash-ﬂow – taxation anyway. Under a cash-ﬂow tax, the neutrality with
regard to consumption and investment choices would be guaranteed. The ETR
would always be equal to the nominal tax rate τ, regardless of the distribution of
cash-ﬂows over time.
• Accrual treatment of human capital would be the correct way to treat human capital
payoffs under an income tax. It would involve the estimation of future cash-ﬂows
and thus introduce a fair amount of uncertainty into taxation28.
• Quite another idea involves the application of multipliers to the tax base in order to
level the playing ﬁeld between physical and human capital29. This proposal must be
viewed as a compromise that manages to salvage the traditional taxation of interest
while still balancing out the different tax burdens weighing on human and physical
capital. It can take either of two forms:
– The multipliers can be determined as age-dependent. The tax base or tax
rate would therefore have to exceed the current one for young workers and
fall below the current one for older workers, i.e. the multiplier would have to
be set above one initially and then slide below one during the lifetime of the
worker30. Figure 3 on the following page drives home this point for a university
graduate. It plots the development of the economic proﬁt and cash-ﬂows, as
connected in equation (1). The connection is established through the economic
depreciations which are also plotted. To align cash-ﬂows and economic proﬁts,
a fourth plot gives the necessary multipliers. While in section A of ﬁgure 3 the
multipliers are set above one, they drop almost to zero during the approach
to retirement. These multipliers are speciﬁc to a particular lifetime proﬁle of
wages.
– Alternatively, tax law can set a constant tax rate for human capital payoffs
that sees to it that in present value terms, human capital pays the taxes that
would be due under an ideal income tax while maintaining its cash-ﬂow tax
base. This idea will now be pursued further.
4.3 Multipliers for the Cash-Flow Tax Base
As tax law currently leaves human capital at a substantial advantage, constant multipli-
ers would have to be set above one. The goal of the alignment should be to lift the ETR
to the level of the assumed neutral taxation, i.e. the nominal tax rate τ.
27 Equivalently, the allowance for corporate equity could be used, as mentioned in subsection 2.1.
28 Lurking in the background is the problem that even if cash-ﬂows were known with certainty,
it would not be necessary to go to great lengths to tax accruals as cash-ﬂows could be taxed
directly.
29 Cf. Kaplow (1994, fn. 76) and Wagner (2000) for the earliest attempts at this solution.
30 While approaching retirement, economic depreciation charges set in that drag the tax base
lower than under the current income tax.
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Figure 3
Development of cash-ﬂows, economic proﬁts, economic depreciations (left axis)
and age-dependent multipliers (right axis) for a upper secondary school degree
holder with subsequent university studies, i=5%
While this may be a rather technical description, the reasoning behind the correction
is quite important for the economic well-being of societies: an uneven taxation leads
to misallocations in the economy whose costs are largely hidden and hard to measure
(Wagner, 2000, p. 432). Income generation from human capital is extended too far in
comparison to income generation from ﬁnancial capital. In other words: The smartest
way for young people to save – from the point of view of taxation – would be to invest in
their human capital instead of putting the money in the bank.
This is not to say that human capital creation is not welcome in this globalized world.
It has been known to have desirable externalities on economic growth and development
for a long time (Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997; Keuschnigg and Dietz, 2007). The trouble
is that taxation distorts the decision to engage in human capital creation. And it does
not distort in an equivalent manner across the board: Some groups proﬁt more from
the unevenness of the taxation than others. If government comes to the conclusion that
agents do not engage in enough human capital accumulation and it wants to promote
the creation, it can give direct subsidies, such as student loans with favorable interest
rates or grants, or provide more teachers to schools. But under the current dualism of
cash-ﬂow based taxation on the one hand and accrual based taxation on the other hand,
government can never be sure whether it is deploying the best measures for its worthy
aims as the playing ﬁeld is skewed in the ﬁrst place.
To derive the actual multiplier m, the formerly constant nominal tax rate τ is now
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divided into a rate levied on capital income τc and a rate on labor income τl.
τl = mτc (14)
To this end, the separation of the pension payments into deferred labor income and
capital income becomes important. The return implicit in the pensions is determined as
the internal rate of return of the pension contributions and beneﬁts. The pension pay-
ments are treated as an annuity, where the typical pattern is that of interest payments
falling and of capital paybacks rising.
Upon retirement, the future beneﬁciary has accumulated a notional capital stock
which is equal to the future value of the pension contributions contbt at t=65, com-




contbt (1 + IRR)
65−t (15)
From the future value in equation (15), the annuity is paid. The interest part (INt) of
the annuity is subject to the tax rate τc, while the rest of the pension (REt) is treated as
labor income and subject to τl, as is the gross income minus pension contributions (CFt)
during the labor market participation of the worker. The interest part of the annuity is
ﬁxed at 27%, using the legal provision in the German Income Tax Code in force until
2004 which ﬁxed the interest part of the pension beneﬁt at that level.
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INt (1 − τc) + REt (1 − τl)
(1 + i(1 − τc))
t (16)
Entering equation (16) and equation (14) into equation (6) and setting the ETR equal to
the desired level τc gives
ETRDIT =























The ﬁnal goal is to determine m from equation (17). This job is carried out using an
iteration algorithm that raises τl, starting from τc, until the ETRDIT hits τc. Table 7 on
the following page reports results for the multiplier m, according to the prevailing interest
rate. Figure 4 on page 19 highlights the relationship graphically.
The same experiment is conducted for the holders of upper secondary school degrees
with subsequent university studies (combination E in table 3). The results in table 8
on the following page and ﬁgure 5 on page 20 show that the multipliers for this highly
educated group are higher across the board.
Overall, the computations result in substantial surcharges to the capital income tax
rate τc. The Dual Income Tax brings with it distributional problems if the labor tax rate
is set uniformly across all taxpayers: setting too high a rate causes the lower income
brackets to pay over the odds, while setting too low a rate unduly beneﬁts the upper end
of the labor income scale. The central distributional issue for the Dual Income Tax thus
pits those rich in human capital against those poor in it, or, to put it differently, those
with high growth rates in labor income against those with low growth rates.
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Table 7
Multipliers m and tax rates on labor income τl under a Dual Income Tax for a male
secondary school degree holder (combination B in table 3), for variable interest
rate i and capital income tax rates τc = 18%,27%
i 0% 2% 4% 6%
m 1.00 1.64 2.07 2.37
τl 18.00% 29.50% 37.21% 42.59%
m 1.00 1.55 1.90 2.14
τl 27.00% 41.91% 51.37% 57.67%
On the other hand, the fact that the rate on labor income is set above that on capital
income reﬂects the insight gained in this article that the differences in the determination
of the tax bases between labor income and capital income warrant this step. In any
event, the sensitivity of the rate τl to the interest rate remains high. A sensible choice in
this area is pivotal for the distributional “equity” of the Dual Income Tax.
Table 8
Multipliers m and tax rates on labor income τl under a Dual Income Tax for a male
upper secondary school degree holder (combination E in table 3), for variable
interest rate i and capital income tax rates τc = 18%,27%
i 0% 2% 4% 6%
m 1.00 1.69 2.18 2.54
τl 18.00% 30.47% 39.32% 45.80%
m 1.00 1.60 1.99 2.26
τl 27.00% 43.09% 53.77% 61.15%
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Figure 4
Tax rates on labor income under a Dual Income Tax for a male secondary school
degree holder (combination B in table 3), for capital income tax rates τc = 18%,27%
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Figure 5
Tax rates on labor income under a Dual Income Tax for a male upper secondary
school degree holder with subsequent university studies (combination E in
table 3), for capital income tax rates τc = 18%,27%
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5 Conclusion
This article has sought to answer the question how well the taxation of labor income
currently in force approximates the theoretical tax treatment due under an ideal income
tax. This question prompted a more fundamental review of the whole notion of income
taxation and whether, at least under the condition of perfect foresight and a perfect and
complete capital market, it can be salvaged. As it turns out, the contribution by Wenger
(1999) has shattered the cozy world of income tax fans to its core. As the calibration
mark of the concept of economic proﬁts, necessary to spot discriminatory or privileged
treatment under tax law, itself is shaky, analysis based on it carries a whiff of shakiness.
The use of a very recent dataset rendered possible a realistic estimation of incomes
over the lifetime of differently educated groups. The analysis in subsection 3.2 showed
that ETRs for the German population are uneven and lowest among the most highly
educated groups. Most importantly, under the assumptions made, they rarely come
close to the assumed neutral yardstick of the economic concept of proﬁt. In most cases,
the ETR declines monotonically for increasing interest and tax rates. This effect can be
traced back to the fact that the tax base under the current comprehensive income tax
is the sum of a hash of different deﬁnitions of “income”, as shown in subsection 2.1.
Compared to a consistent treatment, labor gets a favorable deal.
The results give tentative support for the Dual Income Tax. The dualism of accrual
and non-accrual based tax bases under the current income tax is untenable. Raising
the tax rate on wages can be a remedy for the resulting distortion between investments
in ﬁnancial and human capital. This insight has not taken hold as much as one might
hope for. The dualism of the tax bases under the current tax law is regularly ignored.
Any choice for the spread between the capital and labor income tax rate has serious
distributional implications and thus contains the potential for conﬂicts between differ-
ently educated groups of workers. Quite another, more enticing option would be to
replace income taxes with taxes on consumption. Such a move would render the topic of
this article moot as the distribution of the wages over the lifetime would not impact the
effective tax rate anymore. Recent German discussions make it unlikely that a funda-
mental overhaul of the German tax system could end up in a switch to a consumption
tax. The abolition of interest taxation that is the hallmark of such a system is not easily
conveyed in the political process and invites myopic opponents to stab the proposal in
the back. Yet enforcement of taxation of capital income has been weak under the current
comprehensive income tax. A more consistent taxation at a lower rate might be both
politically feasible and more lucrative than the current mess. The Dual Income Tax rep-
resents a welcome compromise between income and consumption based tax systems.
Important caveats for the Dual Income Tax remain:
• The relative size of the capital and labor tax rate is crucially dependent on assump-
tions about the long-term real interest rate.
• Other economic effects can play a role and make the case for the Dual Income Tax
more or less convincing (Sørensen, 1993). A rationale based entirely on time and
tax rate effects might fall short of the requirements of a comprehensive overhaul of
the tax system. The presence of important distortions in the labor market has the
potential to destroy many of the gains from the Dual Income Tax.
• The interlinkage between taxation on the corporate and personal level constitutes
the “Achilles heel of the Dual Income Tax” (Sørensen, 1994, p. 73). Particularly the
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taxation of small businesses, where proﬁts must be split between capital and labor
income, is a source of endless conﬂicts in the Nordic countries (Alstadsæter, 2003;
Hagen and Sørensen, 1998; Mut´ en, 1996).
On the German political front, the issue confronted in this article is currently a hot
potato. The introduction of a ﬁnal withholding tax31 that is planned for the year 2009
would represent a ﬁrst important step toward a Dual Income Tax in all but name.
Overall, the low approximation quality of the current cash-ﬂow based taxation of labor
income for the economic income tax should provide ample reason to renew the discussion
on this subject. It may thus be hoped that the project “Dual Income Tax” gains traction
in Germany.
31 Within the European Union, Germany’s neighbors have been toying with some form of Dual
Income Taxation for the last ten years. Final withholding taxes on interest and dividend income
were introduced in Austria, Belgium and Italy. Greece and the Netherlands have also adopted
special regimes applicable to capital income (Eggert and Genser, 2005, p. 47).
22A Derivation of Equation (11)
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As the limits of the outer sums in the last line match, it is a sufﬁcient condition for the
whole sums to yield equal values that every single element be equal. Thus,
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23B Derivation of Equation (13)
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